The Beginning-

The Sino-Soviet alliance following Communist consolidation of power in China. (1949) Soviet assistance and high relations between the two countries.

The Sino-Soviet Split-

Also known as the Sino-Soviet Split. Several factors must be taken into account to explain why the USSR and the PRC experienced a falling out. Included, but not all, will be the events in Taiwan, India, and the divergence on the part of the Chinese from Russian Communist Orthodoxy.

Involvement in Vietnam-

The body of the paper. Focusing on the goal of the stated thesis: What were the conditions that influenced the Soviets and the Chinese to become involved in the Vietnam war and what factors minimized/maximized their respective involvement. This section will trace a variety of events. The Cuban Missile Crisis: Its importance would decide by which means China and the Soviet Union would 'negotiate' with the U.S. For the Soviets it was nuclear; for the Chinese it would Mao's insistence on the strength and immortality of the populace.

The Sino-Soviet Contest-

With shaky relations between the PRC and the USSR, both countries embarked on paths of negative propaganda. Strong Chinese accusations against the validity of Soviet ideology and their collusion with the U.S. typified this contest. The Soviets were guilty as well, but the issue of nuclear sovereignty hounded the Chinese and placed the Soviets on a completely different relation level with the U.S.

The Cultural Revolution/Tet Offensive-

Coupled together, these events served to make Chinese influence on North Vietnam noticeably less to almost non-existent. This section will focus on those conditions surrounding these two events and the effects on Chinese influence.

From People's War to Tank War-

As the armed conflict against U.S. supported South Vietnam began to change, so did the needs of the DRV. Soviet ability to provide the necessary 'high grade' technology and equipment would surmount the Chinese domination.

Final Relations and the End of War-

An analysis and investigation of the global relations that were created by the Vietnam War. Important is the development of open relations between the Chinese and Americans when they had prior been none to speak of. Along with this, two important facets involving the PRC and the USSR, the Damanski Island incident and Chinese/Vietnamese War, will be examined here.

Bibliography and Notes

 

 

 

The Beginning of Relations (Return to Index)

In 1954 the Communists in North Vietnam reached a turning point in their history. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu was a turning point in the history of this country. Free from the oppression of foreign countries the Communists of the DRV were freed to turn their attention to the task at hand; the infiltration and subjugation of South Vietnam. The influence that both China and the Soviet Union had on this fledgling government was substantial. Without the necessary material, logistics, and support the Communist victory in South Vietnam would never have come about. This paper looks to examine the motives that both the Chinese and Soviets had in their commitment to supporting the DRV in the Vietnam War.

In dealing with the motives of both China and the Soviet Union it is also important to keep in mind the conditions of the world in this time period, 1950-1975. Both foreseen and unforeseen events would alter the respective policies of each country. In observing these events, this paper will take a chronological prose; history will be dealt with as it was made. In this style of analysis it is possible to shed some light on a seemingly confusing array of foreign policy's that even till today are hard to rationalize. China and the Soviet Union altered their obligation and support levels to North Vietnam according their policies and the history that those decisions produced.

The United States will provide a backdrop to the Sino-Soviet involvement in Vietnam. This will provide insight into the relative positions that China and the Soviet Union took in North Vietnam. To both of these countries the United States represented 'the other side'. This is to say that the ideologies of both socialist countries depicted America as the opponent. In ideology this is true; capitalism was the precursor to a more egalitarian socialist society. This was to prove more so for the Chinese Communists, but that will be explained later. It is safe to say that both countries were able to rationalize their actions by telling the world they were defending one of their 'brothers' from an imperialist power.

When making reference to the United States as the 'other side' it is crucial to remember that this analogy is only relative to the shifting relationship that each country would experience with the U.S. as the Vietnam War escalated. Ultimately, the decision to alienate or be-friend the U.S. depended on the position that the other 'guy' had. In this style of summary it becomes clear that the support to the North Vietnamese was for the primary benefit of the Chinese and the Soviets themselves. This reduces North Vietnam to a staging area for China and the Soviet Union to formulate and implement their objective and influence against the US and one another.

This paper will use Mao's consolidation of power in China in 1949 as a starting point. With the defeat of US supported Chang Kai Shek and the KMT, the Chinese Communist Party had established a new socialist country. Soviet aid to the communists during their fight against the nationalists had been substantial. The alliance that the two made in 1949 was of pledged support and allegiance. From Mao's speech at the Moscow airport, "Comrades, we will stand together forever, fighting for world peace and the victory of our common cause!" The course of the 1950's marked good relations between the two countries. In fact China was the leading beneficiary of Soviet aid abroad during the '50s. In keeping with this tint, many of the economic and political statutes of the Soviet model were absorbed by the CCP. The reason for doing such was clear; the Chinese were trying to establish a socialist government and the success that the Soviets had left its indelible impression on the young government. The latter half of this decade would see a change in relations between the Soviet Union and China; a change in policy that would ultimately force a split in interests between the two communist parties.

The Sino-Soviet Split (Return to Index)

Many factors influenced Sino-Soviet involvement in the Vietnam War but no factor was as influential in their levels of involvement as dictated by their relationship towards one another. This above all things would serve to guide their actions in Indo-China.

Tensions between the two countries could be felt as early as 1956. Soviet intervention in Hungary was met with criticism by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Tse-Tung. Perhaps the most estranging move between the two countries came at a poolside conference between Mao and Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev. The subject was the Communist attitude toward the west. As recorded in Krushchev's diary, Mao was recorded as saying,

Mao replied by trying to assure me that the atomic bomb itself was a paper tiger! "Listen Comrade Khrushchev, he said. "All you have to do is provoke the Americans into military action, and I'll give you as many divisions as you need to crush them-a hundred, two hundred, one thousand divisions." I tried to explain to him that one or two missiles (nuclear) could turn all the divisions in China to dust. But he wouldn't even listen to my arguments and obviously regarded me as a coward.

This incident itself left a permanent impression on Khrushchev. His relationship towards Chairman Mao had previously been one of high regard and admiration, but from this point on a distancing between the two can be felt. At the root of this separation was the issue of the U.S.

The Soviet attitude towards the United States was always one on a professional level. As is evident in Mao's comment above the, the People's Republic of China (PRC) held a more militant position than their neighboring communists. Khrushchev's attempts in the late '50s (1959) to coordinate efforts with the U.S. was met with more criticism from the Chinese Communists. His trip to Camp David was proof of this as Mao called Khrushchev's notion of peaceful co-existence a "bourgeois pacifist notion'. At about this time the split between the two countries was confirmed. It would mark the last time that leaders from either country would visit one another.

On another note, the Soviet Union never wished to engage the U.S. in armed conflict. It can even be surmised that relations with the U.S. were more revered than those with the Chinese. Whether or not this peculiarity was apparent in the early '50's it was certainly clear to the Chinese by the time that the Vietnam War came around. In support of this, "The Russians, while actually giving important military aid, have sought to avoid unduly provocative threats that might seriously damage their relations with Washington". The position that the Soviets took in 1958 with the Taiwan incident defends this statement. The Chinese had for some time been wanting to invade the island of Taiwan and crush the remaining Kuomintang, anti-Communist, pro-U.S., Chinese nationalists (KMT). When the Soviets were asked to back this incursion they declined. The Chinese were left to do it themselves and at the risk of provoking nuclear war with the U.S. they finally backed down. The refusal on the part of the Soviet Communists to support their comrade’s left the Chinese feeling alienated.

The Taiwan incident alone would serve to be one of the primary reasons for poor relations with the U.S. in the late 1950's, and the course of the 1960's. The Chinese understood the actions on the part of the Americans, via their military and political presence, to be a direct and intended threat to China. On this note, Premier of China, Chou En-lai stated,

It is the imperialist policy of the U.S Government, and not merely the fact that U.S. troops have invaded and occupied China's Taiwan, that has put the U.S. Government in the position of being the enemy of these peoples. The invasion and occupation of Taiwan can only make the U.S. the enemy of the Chinese people.

This excerpt from an interview in 1960 between Edgar Snow and Premier En-lai marks the Chinese attitude towards the United States. It's significance becomes critical when taking into account Soviet-American relations, and the repercussions those alliances would have on the PRC.

Feelings between the two further deteriorated with Chinese actions against India in 1962. For some time the frontier disputes between China and India had gone unabated. The situation reached critical when the Chinese invaded India causing a rebuttal from the U.S. Again the Soviets refused to support or defend the actions of the Chinese. From the Soviet point of view this was again an attempt to devaluate the importance of Khrushchev's attempts at peaceful co-existence. Whether or not the Soviet government secretly advocated the Chinese invasion was insignificant. The conditions of the time prevented them from acting. As summarized by one historian, "Soviet power is not unlimited, and the USSR cannot challenge the U.S. to a nuclear duel for the sake of other socialist countries."

The Chinese Communists marked the exact opposite of the Soviets dealing with the 'Imperialists' of the west. For example, "In contrast, loud threats and temperate actions came to symbolize the Chinese posture in the Vietnam conflict." For Mao and the Chinese Communists the war against the Americans was an ideological one,

It is my opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point. There are two winds in the world today, the East Wind and the West Wind. There is a Chinese saying, "Either the East Wind prevails over the West Wind or the West Wind prevails over the East Wind." I believe it is the characteristic of the situation today that the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind. That is to say, the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism.

The specifics of each other's foreign policies would be decisive in determining how much aid or pledged support would be given to the communists in North Vietnam. In turn their ideologies would serve to respectively draw them into the conflict in Indo-China. For these reasons and more to come the Chinese and the Soviets would resort to differing levels of involvement in accordance to their relations with the Vietnamese, Americans, and one another.

Involvement in Vietnam (Return to Index)

In analyzing the conditions that brought China and the Soviet Union into the Vietnam War it is important to remember that the course of the war itself was a significant determinant. The needs of the North Vietnamese Communists, relative to their conflict with South Vietnam and the U.S., dictated towards which country, the Soviet Union or China, they would be more pressed to call upon. To make sense of this take for example the Tet Offensive in 1968. Although a considerable political victory for the North the casualties that they incurred were atrocious. Most reports claim that the effective strength of the Viet Cong was reduced to 20%, having absorbed some 30 to 40 thousand casualties. Regular DRV units were seriously damaged including most front line units. With their ability to infiltrate the South destroyed the North Vietnamese were reduced to fighting more of a conventional war; like the Soviet model. Prior to Tet the North had been following Mao's ideology; that being the People's War, a guerrilla war.

The Chinese influence on the North was more so than the Soviets at the end of the '50s and the start of the 1960's. This influence, as it would be for most of the war, came in the form of culture and ideology. In fact it was Mao's insistence at the start of the 1960's that the North begin to infiltrate the South. In convincing the DRV that this must be their strategy he reminded them that this was the same tactic used by Mao and the Chinese Communists against the KMT and the Japanese. As quoted from Mao,

The Red Army won its many victories-beginning with only a few dozen rifles in the hands of determined revolutionaries...The enemy was infinitely our superior militarily, but politically it was immobilized.

This reflects the Chinese belief in People's War. For the Chinese, support of the North Vietnamese was a task that they were bound to by their very ideology. Their insistence that the DRV fight a People's War was the main style of strategy employed against the forces of the U.S. and South Vietnam.

In accordance to their less than hospitable relationship with the U.S., the Chinese included fair amounts of material and personal support to compliment their ideological suggestions. In fact, substantial units of regular People's Liberation Army (PLA) were sent to North Vietnam; their intended purpose to "offer Hanoi the most reliable guarantee against a possible American invasion." These soldiers were directed to help build fortifications in and around Hanoi, including a network of systems that would provide direct Chinese response should the American military try and breach Sino-Vietnamese communications. By 1965 these PLA units totaled some 50,000 men. In comparison to the Soviet assistance to the DRV, this can be interpreted as direct involvement, and a public and visual one at that, something that the Soviets would not openly undertake. In accordance with their respective and established relations with the U.S, the move on the part of the Chinese was clear. The Soviets had no desire to provoke a rebuttal from the U.S. and their support of Vietnam was to be reflective of that.

The Cuban Missile Crisis (Return to Index)

The reason for a lack of involvement at the onset of the Vietnam War can be attributed to the Soviet Communists influence and engagement in other theaters around the world. The Cuban Missile Crisis in October of 1962 was a good enough place for the Soviet Union to be engaging the 'imperialists'. The Cuban Missile Crisis is worth expanding on for it alone would determine the actions and policies of the USSR with regard to the U.S. and the fact that these established 'rules of engagement' would direct the Soviets in their position taken in the Vietnam War.

In hindsight, the installation and maintenance of Communist Cuba cost the Soviets a fortune. Originally Castro had favored an economy similar to the one that Hitler envisioned for Germany; that is autarky, or self-sufficiency of the state with no outside support. His abandonment of this plan meant the bringing in of outside funds and that responsibility fell on the Soviet Union. It is recorded that by 1973, Cuba was costing the Soviet Union 1,500,000 dollars a day to maintain, with repayment well into the twenty-first century. Of Khrushchev's aid programs to the Third World Communist regimes, this was by far the costliest.

It should be quickly pointed out here that for this very reason the Soviets would have been reluctant to lunge into another money consuming alliance. This would help to explain their indesire to commit to the DRV early in the war. The residue of the bill to Cuba and the amount it cost the Soviets had certainly left its scars.

In October of 1962 American surveillance aircraft detected missile sites on the island of Cuba. In reprisal, President Kennedy ordered a naval quarantine of the island. For two weeks the world waited in nuclear apprehension as Kennedy and Khrushchev worked out an arrangement that would include Soviet removal of their missiles.

The significance of this event would prove immense. It carried with it three ideas that would exemplify Soviet attitude and foreign affair policies towards the U.S. for the course of the '60s. First, it was on the top of Khrushchev's list that the Soviet Union achieve a strategic balance with the United States. Khrushchev's Cuban plan was to be a realization of this goal. If he could confront the United States with a viable nuclear threat then 'it would make possible an accommodation across the board.' (Indeed the Soviets did not achieve this 'balance' and their actions in Vietnam were to be dictated by this 'imbalance'.

Secondly, with this plan Khrushchev envisioned he could indeed match American nuclear capacity. The stationing of nuclear weapons in Cuba was by no means intended for the defense of Cuba itself. That could have been accomplished with the stationing of Soviet ground forces. Rather, it was an attempt by Khrushchev to counter what nuclear weapons the U.S. could launch against the USSR. His plan was to use Cuba as the staging area to launch a first strike or counterattack. (Keep in mind, all in the attempt to make the USSR a more viable nuclear threat) It is recorded that the United States had at the time of the crisis 144 submarine launched missiles, 294 ICBM's and complete conventional military domination of that area. Soviet strategic planning for this operation was conducted with full recognition of American reconnaissance and abilities. (Note: The Soviets had shot down the U-2 spy plane with Gary Powers in 1960) The idea that the U.S. would not realize what was going on before it was to late and that Khrushchev could make the two countries nuclear proportionate was unrealistic.

Lastly, the Cuban Missile Crisis was evidence that the Soviet Union was making serious attempts to equal the nuclear capacity of the United States. Throughout the 1960's, under both Khrushchev and Breznev, (particularly the latter), the Soviets would attempt to close this gap. Proportionately, in the mid '60s, the Soviets were far behind what the Americans could put up against them. In 1964 the Soviet ICBM level reached around 200 compared to 834 American and 120 submarine launched to 416, respectively.

On another note, it is interesting to what degree China and the USSR countered the U.S. nuclear threat. For the Soviets reducing or removing the American threat meant countering with more nuclear weapons. The belief was that only through equal nuclear capacity could the Soviets be in a position to 'deal' with the U.S. When the ratio of weapons possessed by each side was equated and found to be equivalent, only then would the Americans be forced to observe Soviet interests.

This can be tied in with the Vietnam issue in the fact that the Soviets did not step up aid to the DRV until the late 1960's. Reports indicate that Soviet aid to Hanoi between 1955 and 1961 totaled between $150-300 million dollars. Yet by the above-mentioned time that the Soviets caught up with the U.S in nuclear totals, year 1967-68, the Soviets were turning over $700 million a year to the DRV. The correlation here, although it can also be attributed to other contributing factors, cannot be ignored.

The Chinese response to the American threat involved a completely different angle to offset the nuclear imbalance. The Chinese did not possess the means to undergo a 'nuclear argument' so they relied on something they did have; a large populace. On this subject Mao himself typified the nuclear imbalance this way,

The atom bomb is a paper tiger used by the US reactionaries to scare people. It looks terrible but in fact it isn't. Of course the atom bomb is a weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not by one or two new types of weapons.

This was always the response of Mao to the constant threat of U.S. nuclear reciprocity. Towards the end of the 1960's he was recounted as saying that even in the face of a full nuclear assault there would still be 600 million Chinese left to fight whereas the lesser populated capitalist countries would be devastated.

To finish up the segment on the nuclear issues created by the Cuban Missile Crisis it can be noted that by the end of the sixties the nuclear gap between the U.S. and the USSR would indeed close, and ultimately cease to exist as the Soviet Union would overtake the U.S. in pure megatonnage, that is, the explosive power delivered by a missile and it's warhead(s). However, what the U.S. lacked in tonnage it made up for in technology and accuracy and it is arguable that the Soviets were always on the 'losing' end of the missile, if such a statement seems rational. (By this time there were enough nuclear weapons possessed by either side to destroy each other many times over)

What remains is that the nuclear dilemma was a prevailing condition for the USSR. As long as the U.S. held the upper hand the Soviets were in a 'submissive' position. The Chinese too are to be considered in the same light although Mao would have had the world believe otherwise.

Aside from this brief conflict relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were relatively good, certainly better than both countries relations with the Chinese. In fact the Soviets, much like the Americans, were hoping that the events in Indo-China would begin to die down. It can be said, "Soviet interest in all of Southeast Asia, by the end of 1963, was dying. The American perspective can be summarized by Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense for the Johnson Administration. "So I conclude that John Kennedy would have eventually gotten out of Vietnam rather than move more deeply in."

Perhaps it was the threat of nuclear war that formed an almost professional agreement between the two governments of the Soviet Union and America, and something that the Chinese resented and would not have with the U.S. until the early 1970's. (Kissinger and Nixon's visits to China) It became apparent that the fight between Socialism and Capitalism would have to be fought on a more neutral soil, neither country could consciously tolerate the thought of nuclear war or even the danger of force at their own back door. (Hence the agreement between the two to remove their respective missiles from Cuba and Turkey) The Chinese did not enter this equation for they did not possess nuclear technology and would not until 1966. Russia deliberately tried to keep this from the Chinese in the hope that China would be dependent on the nuclear protection of the Soviet Union. This would in turn force subordination.

The Sino-Soviet Contest (Return to Index)

Needless to say, the Soviet policy of keeping nuclear capabilities from the Chinese served to further undermine their relations, or lack thereof. On this point the Chinese accused the Soviets of collaborating with the Americans. For evidence of this conspiracy they cited the '1963 treaty on the suspension of nuclear tests...in order to retain their nuclear monopoly and deprive China of that right.'

In keeping with the above-mentioned nuclear collusion, this section will focus on the contest for influence that the both China and the Soviet Union began to undertake in Vietnam. The issue of one country trying to thwart the influence of the other is of primary focus in this paper. If taken to be view one of the principal reasons that both China and the Soviet Union became involved in the Vietnam War, it can not be ignored.

On the part of the Soviets, Khrushchev openly accused the Chinese of negative influence in the North Vietnamese Communist party with its purpose to harm Soviet-Vietnamese relations. As Khrushchev put it, "I don't think China will release Vietnam from its paws, and pro-Chinese forces will remain powerful in Vietnam. They will do all they can to make Vietnam out of China's hand". Khrushchev was right on this point; the Chinese did indeed have substantial control over the operations in North Vietnam. As cited earlier, this can be associated in large part to the cultural and ideological similarities that the two countries shared. Whatever the reasons, the Soviet impression of this relationship was one of disdain.

The Chinese continued to openly lambaste the Soviets. Realizing that there foothold in North Vietnam did indeed rely almost solely on their ideology, they moved to accuse the Soviets of further collusion with the U.S.

At a time when people's of the Asian are strengthening their unity in a fierce struggle against US imperialism, there are certain persons who are collaborating with US imperialism in evil-doing, fraternizing with Japanese reactionaries, and even maintaining dirty relations with Lon Nol and his like. (Taken from Peking Review July 3, 1970)

Reasons for the harshness of Chinese allegations can be attributed to the prevailing situation that they were beginning to find themselves in. Whether or not it was intended, by 1965 and through the end of the decade, the Chinese were holding on to a more and more precarious situation. However the Soviet actions in Vietnam are to be interpreted, at the least, they presented the CCP with the threat of being encircled by the USSR. (This is meant literally, geo-graphically) The possibility in thought of such an encirclement served to encourage the Chinese in their verbal and political offensive against the Soviet Union.

 

The Cultural Revolution and The Tet Offensive (Return to Index)

By the mid 1960's, Soviet and Chinese influence and aid was beginning to become proportional. This represented a serious threat to the Chinese who, having burned as many bridges and alienated as many countries as they had in the pervious ten years, could not afford to come out on the short end of the stick again. As fate would have it, and coupled with two catastrophic events, the dreaded reality of coming up short (especially to the Soviets) would transpire.

The first of these to be examined will be the Tet Offensive. As mentioned earlier, the impact that it had on NVA and Viet Cong fighting forces was immense. Coupled with the basic fact that a military offensive of such nature was adherent to Chinese strategy, the loss to both the Vietnamese and the Chinese was substantial.

In accordance to Mao's and Chinese policy of the People's War, the Tet Offensive in January of 1968 can be viewed as a success. As mentioned earlier, one of the fundamental goals of the People's War was to make statistical loss a political victory. In part, this turned out to be the case. Most arguments made concerning the war in Vietnam regard the Tet Offensive as a political loss for the U.S. and a turning point for American involvement in the war. Mao's response to its significance was made in the usual Mao tone of absolute indignance for the loss of human life. As quoted from Mao, "The People in other parts of the world will still more clearly see that U.S. imperialism can be defeated, and that what the Vietnamese people can do, they can do to."

Then, relatively speaking and in accordance with Maoist ideology, the Tet Offensive remains a success. However, what separated it from being a complete success, say similar to the Chinese victory over the Japanese, was that the North Vietnamese would not be able to effectively use what remained of the Viet Cong. The oversight on the part of the Chinese was the fact that the North Vietnamese did not have the same size of populace that the Chinese had to fall back on. The U.S. was well aware of this de facto, and had even coined it the "crossover point"-the point at which Viet Cong losses exceeded capabilities to replace them. Then in terms of failure or success, the Tet Offensive would ultimately be a failure for no longer could the Vietnamese fight the style of war that Mao abdicated, the People's War; guerrilla war.

The other of these events, the Great Proletariat Cultural Revolution (GPCR) would ultimately have very little to do with the North Vietnamese, but everything to do with the Chinese. The 'purge' of the CCP that Mao and the Red Guards undertook in the 1960's would alter China's ability to effectively preside in global affairs. And the fact that this bloodshed would continue for close to ten years would help serve to remove China from affairs in Indo-China.

This is not meant that because of China's internal strife the government officials did not want to remain involved in the Vietnam War; it is quite the contrary. With regard to its own security, China said,

US imperialist aggression in South Vietnam is spearheaded against both the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the People's Republic of China. The security of China and Vietnam is indivisible.

In light of this statement by the Chinese it is clear that their intentions in Vietnam were forthright and determined. The drain that the GPCR put on the country (China) removed much of the material, time, and aid that could have gone to North Vietnam.

Quite literally, the GPCR served to suck much of the Chinese economic and political system dry, particularly the latter of the two. What could be sent to aid the DRV often ended up in the hands of the Red Guards, a coalition of students and educated, intent on destroying the pre-existing Chinese government and political system. In support of this statement, Premier of China, Chou En-Lai,

...Commented that in a single skirmish during the Cultural Revolution 'more than 10,000 shells' had been expended. Originally, those shells had been intended to be given 'in support of Vietnam'.

Clearly, the GPCR was draining the Chinese ability to subsidize the DRV. Further proof in the statistical drop in aid to 200 million dollars by 1968, when the Vietnamese would have needed it most (Tet Offensive), exemplifies the prevailing conditions in China.

From People's War to Tank War (Return to Index)

Clearly the GPCR and the Tet Offensive caused a decrease in aid and relations between the Chinese and Vietnamese. The Soviet Union would be the beneficiary of Chinese misfortune. Coupled with the American decision to increasingly rely on air strikes as the means of attrition, the North Vietnamese were pressed into a position of reliance on one thing. Technology. The Soviets were the only ones who could provide the weapons necessary to combat the conventional tactics of South Vietnam and the U.S. As a result, Chinese influence began to decline but 'did not disappear'.

Statistical support of this Soviet technological edge is crucial to understanding the significance of this issue in light of Vietnamese-Soviet relations. As mentioned earlier, when the U.S decided to step up their involvement in the Vietnam War, in the form of increased air strikes against North Vietnamese targets, the DRV was inclined to look to the Soviets for military support. This increased involvement on the part of the U.S. began to place in the spring of 1965. In the face of this superior technological threat, the Soviet Union was able to come to the aid of the DRV. As quoted from Douglas Pike,

The first surface-to-air missiles with Soviet technical advisers arrived in February (1965), the same month that strikes in North Vietnam. As a result, some 500,000 tons of war material arrived in North Vietnam in 1965; 1.5 million metric tons (mt) arrived in 1966, followed by 2 million mt in 1967. The number of radar-controlled anti- aircraft weapons rose from virtually nothing in mid 1964 to 1,500 by mid-1965 and 6,000 by October 1966.

Clearly then, the decision on the part of the U.S. to step up its activity in Southeast Asia was a serious motivator for the Soviets to do the same. Not only that, but now the USSR had an edge on the Chinese in what it could offer the DRV. With Chinese ideological stranglehold on North Vietnam now loosened by the threat of having to now fight a more conventional, Soviet style war, the USSR began to effectively assert itself as the dominant influence in North Vietnam.

Of other significance was the policies of China and the Soviet Union with regards to the U.S. As a result of their increased aid to the DRV, the Soviet-American relationship began to suffer even more. Although their relationship still remained on the ‘professional level’, open lines of communication and visiting diplomats, the repercussions of each other's respective decisions could be felt. American ‘Vietnamization’ of the South Vietnamese army was denounced by the Soviets but not openly blasted. (Vietnamization was literally the US preparing the South Vietnamese to fight their own war so that the U.S. could step out.) The accidental sinking of a Soviet freighter in Haiphong harbor in 1972, which was met with little rebuttal from the USSR marks the safeness of these relations.

The Chinese, in keeping with their prose throughout the war, continued to voicibly accuse the Soviets and Americans. The Soviets pursued relations still on a more professional note. This quote sums up the relative positions of China and the USSR,

In their attempt to retain control of North Vietnam the Chinese had served to alienate both the Soviet Union and the US. In their haste to establish themselves they had embarked on a self-defeating course. It is safe to say that the Chinese were soon to find themselves in a position of disembarkement; that is, there approach to the Vietnam War and relations with the key players would change drastically in an attempt to make up for lost ground.

Final Relations and the End of the War (Return to Index)

By 1972 it was clear that the U.S. could no longer politically justify or sustain their involvement in Vietnam. It was in this year that most U.S. forces left that theatre of action, save Air Force personnel who still conducted air strikes against North Vietnam. Whatever level of involvement remained for the U.S, it was apparent that the South Vietnamese were going to have to fight their own war.

Chinese influence in the DRV in the early 1970’s was almost non-existent. In 1975, in a meeting between each countries respective diplomats, ensuing allegations and accusations confirmed the removal of Chinese influence in the North Vietnamese communist party.

Soviet influence however remained extremely high with military and material aid continuing at large amounts. The North Vietnamese had become so enthralled with the Soviet model that in fact the Soviets were directly influencing the DRV as to when and what tactics they should be employing in their war against South Vietnam. This is defended a doubling of aid; from 165 million dollars in 1971, to 350 million dollars in 1972 in the anticipation of the Easter Offensive against South Vietnam. Evidently it was the Soviet Union that now controlled the influence game in North Vietnam.

There are two significant events that need to be examined when finishing up the analysis of the conditions that influenced Sino-Soviet involvement in the Vietnam War. The first is the Damanski island incident in 1969 between the Chinese and the Soviets. This event, above all, signifies the point to which relations between these 2 powerful ‘socialist’ had deteriorated.

At the heart of this conflict was the allegations on part of the Soviets that the Chinese were building on Soviet land, without the consent of the Soviet government. This border dispute had been festering for the duration of the 1960’s. The land areas that were in dispute were in the Far East of the Soviet Empire. It should be noted that the Chinese maintained a force of 24 divisions to 12 Russian. On an obscure island in this region, along the Ussuri River, Soviet and Chinese forces clashed. This confrontation took place on Damanski Island on the 2nd of March, 1969. The conflict claimed thirty Russian casualties. At this point it was the Soviets who claimed that the Chinese were responsible.

Two weeks later on the 15th a much larger clash took place. In the ensuing engagement the Chinese lost some 800 dead to almost no Soviet, making it the most significant engagement between the two countries since the 1930’s. This conflict serves to reaffirm to the Chinese that it was clear that they had exceeded the tolerance of Soviet leadership. For so long the verbal accusations from the Chinese had gone unabated. Now the Soviets had taken steps to insure that Chinese allegations towards the Soviets would be restricted to a more ‘professional’ form of condemnation.

As mentioned early at the start of this paper, Chinese influence in North Vietnam rested solely on the DRV’s ability to absorb and successfully implement Chinese ideology. (People’s War) In this pretext, the Chinese claimed to be aiding their young socialist brother against an imperialist aggressor. As the evidence that was presented proved, the only foothold that the PRC could have in North Vietnam was an ideological one. (Remember the quote, The security of the PRC and DRV is indivisible)

The Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979 shattered all of the above mentioned notions. (And Chinese claims for aid) Partly in response to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and partly in fear of Soviet encirclement, the Chinese took action against the North Vietnamese and invaded the DRV across the border in February 1979. The Chinese incursion lasted only three weeks but the casualties sustained by both sides were atrocious. (Some say 60-70,000 with a 2:1 ratio against Vietnam) Whatever the body counts, the move on the part of the Chinese ultimately confirms one very important argument. Indeed, aid and assistance to North Vietnam, even under disguise of ideological ‘brotherly’ support, was used for the sole purpose of Chinese implementation of global foreign policy that was intended to benefit China and not the DRV. Their decision to invade North Vietnam, draw blood, and then withdrawal, defends this assertion. Coupled with this, the Soviet response to this attack was to pump more military aid into North Vietnam, there guise too being to thwart the efforts of the Chinese and in doing so, bolster their own position. (The Soviets never threatened to enter this short conflict but did undertake a ‘crash delivery program of military assistance to Vietnam’ as well as providing a 14-vessel naval task force that steamed the South China Seas)

It is also important to note that with the dawn of the ‘70s came a change in attitude among countries. The Chinese opened themselves up to American diplomats and their influence, with the result being that both countries felt the economic rewards of doing such. Meanwhile, the Soviets were the ones who would have to work to retain and improve their relations with the U.S., something that would really not come about until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.

As conclusive as the Vietnam War was of Chinese and Soviet postures it was in the same stroke just as inconclusive. Events during, and certainly after the war, affirm that their involvement was for their sole benefit. North Vietnam represented a neutral arena for the global exchange of political aggressions and ideologies. (It was certainly a more neutral place for the U.S.

and the USSR but not for the Chinese, which can be taken into account for their blatant, and often violent accusations against the other two) Yet, perhaps it was the necessity of having such an environment in order to ‘vent’ each other’s policies. Certainly, there have been other ‘hotspots’ that saw these key players involvement, but nothing on the scale or level that Vietnam was.

In hindsight, the devastation that this ‘global conflict’ brought to Vietnam was tremendous. The residual effects can still be felt and will so for sometime. The function that Vietnam did serve leaves it in a category all its own. Had it not provided the ‘neutral’ soil for the exchange of capitalist ideals vs. socialist ideals, who’s to say where that fight would have taken place and what would have prevented it from escalating into a more devastating, global war. Ultimately, the accolade goes to the Vietnamese for it was their very persistence and committed struggle that kept this ‘exchange’ on neutral soil. Had it not been for their determination who is to say where the war would have gone and how many other countries would have had to suffer the same plight. In standing up to both Socialism and Capitalism, the Vietnamese proved, indeed, that it is they themselves who are the determinants of their own destiny. And that as their history proves, any successful support or aid, whether it be material or ideological, has the risk of catastrophe. It is that challenge that the policies of every nation are forced to contend with.

 

 

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Bibliography (Return to Index)

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